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INTRODUCTION
The petition for rehearing in this action asserts that
the Court's decision must be viewed as more than merely a
"resolution of a conflict between the plaintiffs and defendants
in the instant case."

Petition for Rehearing at pg. 2. While

the plaintiffs acknowledge that the Court's decision may have
far-reaching consequences, it does in fact represent a
resolution of part of a case between real parties, which should
also be borne in mind.

The plaintiffs should be permitted to

resume prosecution of their claims without the delay which
would inevitably occur if this Court were to permit further
briefing and argument in a case where the positions of the
members of the Court have been set forth in great detail. The
members of the Court have ably supported their respective
positions in an exhaustive opinion.

Any further questions

presented by the Court's decision can be, and will be, resolved
on a case by case basis as the need arises. This case,
however, should simply be allowed to proceed to trial.
POINT I.
THERE IS NO NEED FOR FURTHER
BRIEFING IN THIS ACTION
Nothing constructive would be accomplished by delaying
this action further to permit the defendants to brief the due

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

process question, as that issue is not dispositive of the
action and is not the basis upon which the majority opinion
ultimately rests.

Each member of the majority indicated that

they did not accept the notion that constitutional analysis
under the State constitution should be bound by the rigid
analytical framework employed in federal equal protection
cases.

Justice Stewart noted that this Court had previously

articulated a differing standard of review under Art. I, § 24
of the Utah Constitution when the challenged discrimination
involved the impairment of a plaintiff's right to seek full
damages for personal injury.
(Utah 1984).

See Maian v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661

In emphasizing that the standard for review

should vary depending upon the nature of the right impaired by
a discriminatory statute (and the degree to which it was
impaired), Justice Stewart was in complete agreement with
Justice Durham's opinion, which acknowledged the requirement
that legislation impacting on the constitutionally protected
rights of plaintiffs to seek full damages for injuries should
be reviewed under a heightened standard involving a real and
thoughtful examination of the legislative purpose and the
relationship between the legislation and that purpose.
Justice Zimmerman did not disagree.

He simply joined

Justice Durham in noting that in a case involving limitations
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on the right to recover damages a due process balancing test,
. as set forth in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P,2d 670
(Utah 1985), was a more "straightforward" way for the Court to
free itself from the analytical straightjacket developed under
federal equal protection law.

It is more "straightforward"

because it focuses directly on the nature of the right being
impaired and the manner of its impairment and bypasses analysis
of the classification scheme designating who will and who will
not be subject to the legislative abrogation of a recognized
common law right.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, this Court did
not decide this case on the basis of a constitutional provision
and an analytical standard which were not briefed by the
parties.

Plaintiffs have argued throughout this case that

because their rights under Art. I, § 11 were implicated, a
higher level of scrutiny was required in reviewing the
statute.

Each member of the majority agreed, with Justice

Stewart finding that the heightened scrutiny was necessary
because the statute discriminated in connection with a
constitutional right, while Justices Durham and Zimmerman found
the higher standard to be warranted because of the nature of
right affected, without regard to whether it was impaired in a
manner which separated the plaintiffs from others "similarly
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situated."

Justices Durham and Zimmerman both acknowledge that

the standard of review employed by all the members of the
majority is essentially identical, they merely differ with
Justice Stewart concerning the need to find a discriminatory
classification before undertaking the analysis.

What can't be

denied, however, is that if the statutory limitation on the
right to recover full damages is itself unreasonable, then
certainly the imposition of that unreasonable burden in a
discriminatory manner cannot be constitutional.
As there is no question that the majority of the Court
is of the opinion that the damage limitations provisions in
issue place an unreasonable burden on the constitutionally
protected rights of a class of people who have been singled out
for distinct legislative treatment, there is no reason for the
Court to reconsider in this action which state constitutional
provision may be the most appropriate vehicle for challenging a
statute which impairs rights protected by Art. I, § 11.
POINT II.
DEFENDANTS HAD A FULL OPPORTUNITY TO
MARSHALL ALL AVAILABLE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT
OF THE CHALLENGED STATUTORY SCHEME
The defendants' attempt to characterize the Court's
action, in adopting a standard of review which requires a
demonstration of the reasonable relationship between a
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statute's purpose and the means used to accomplish that
purpose, as a fundamental change in the law which they had no
reason to anticipate is disingenuous.

All members of the Court

acknowledged that, in both state and federal equal protection
analysis, courts have frequently imposed a heightened standard
of review, however characterized, when the challenged statute
implicated significant, though nonfundamental, rights.

In the

trial court, the plaintiffs argued that either strict scrutiny
or a heightened, realistic, level of review should apply.

The

defendants acknowledged the existence of authority supporting
these standards of review but simply asserted they weren't
appropriate in this case.

They were in no way precluded from

the presentation of any factual material or evidence which they
believed may have tended to validate the statute by
demonstrating its reasonableness.

They chose, instead, to rely

upon the argument that the statute should be analyzed under the
minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test, relying upon the
presumption of constitutionality.

All members of this Court

agreed that the State's burden to demonstrate the
reasonableness of a statute's objective varies in relationship
to the significance of the rights affected by the legislation.
The defendant's refusal to acknowledge that such is the case is
no justification for relieving them from the consequences of
their own election.
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POINT III.
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR LIMITING THE
APPLICATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The arguments advanced for prospective application of
the Court's ruling mischaracterize the Court's holding and
totally ignore the effect such a decision would have on the
constitutionally protected rights of the plaintiffs.

This case

did not overrule Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980),
because there was no challenge in that case to the
constitutionality of the legislative attempt to grant tort
immunity where none had existed at common law. Furthermore,
the statute which has been invalidated in this case was amended
more than four years ago and, therefore, no person who doesn't
have a pending claim in litigation could possibly be affected
by the Court's precise holding.

In other words, to request

that the opinion be given prospective effect (and not apply to
the plaintiffs or others with pending claims arising under the
old statute) is to request that the Court's ruling be given no
effect whatsoever.
The defendants' unsubstantiated assertion that they
have relied upon the limitation in doing risk assessment is
both without any evidentiary support and, to some extent,
untrue.

The Hospital did, during some periods when the statute
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was in effect, purchase insurance to cover liability for losses
commencing at an amount which greatly exceeded the statutory
maximums.

Purchase of this "stop loss" or "catastrophic" risk

insurance was prudent and belies the claim that the state
wasn't cognizant of any potential constitutional infirmity in a
scheme whereby an historically nongovernmental function was
simply "defined" to be governmental in direct contravention of
the holding of this Court in Greenlaugh v. Payson City, 530
P.2d 1217 (Utah 1975) .
In exercising its discretion to deviate from the
general rule that a decision is effective both prospectively
and retrospectively (even a truly overruling decision), this
Court must find that a substantial injustice would otherwise
occur.

See Maian v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984).

The

balance of the equities, however, is definitively in favor of
recognizing the primacy of the plaintiffs' constitutional right
to recover their damages free of an arbitrary and inadequate
limit.

For the same reason that the State's perceived fiscal

interests cannot be constitutionally relied upon as a
reasonable basis for imposing the statute's limit on
plaintiffs' recovery, they cannot reasonably be interposed as a
justification for denying to the plaintiffs the benefit of the
very ruling which demonstrates the proper balance between these
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competing interests. After a majority of the Court has held
that the statutory damage limitation in question is an
unreasonable response to the State1s asserted fiscal concerns,
how can it be seriously argued that a substantial injustice
will occur unless those very same state government
considerations are allowed to prevail over the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights?
This is not a case where a private party relied upon a
statute in shaping its decisions.

In this case, the State

enacted an unreasonable statute in an effort to insulate itself
from full liability for activities of the type for which it had
liability at common law.

To the extent the State relied on its

own efforts to impair the constitutionally protected rights of
its citizens, its reliance was just as unreasonable as its
efforts to preclude the plaintiffs from obtaining full redress
for their injuries.
CONCLUSION
While there is obviously a division between members of
the Court concerning the propriety of using substantive due
process as a means of evaluating statutes which impair, but do
not wholly eliminate, a right of action protected under Art. I,
§ 11 of the Utah Constitution, the majority of the Court
clearly believes that the statutes in issue in this case
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unreasonably impair this right and are constitutionally
infirm.

Two members of the Court would reach this result using

a due process analysis. However, it is implicit in their
opinions that the same result would be mandated if an equal
protection analysis was employed under Art. I, § 24.

It would

be pointless, therefore, to rehear this matter after briefing
of an issue which is not essential to the Court's holding.
Finally, the defendants* request to have the Court's
ruling given only prospective effect is, in reality, a request
for reconsideration of the merits of the case.

This is so

because the factors to be weighed in deciding if a substantial
injustice would occur if the holding is applied to this case
are essentially the same factors which shaped the outcome on
the merits. As the Court has already determined that it is
unreasonable to deprive the plaintiffs of their right to pursue
full damages on the basis of a perceived financial benefit
which would be provided to the State by doing so, the same
result must obtain in deciding whether the plaintiffs1 rights
to recover in this case should give way to the financial
concerns of the State.

To strike that balance in favor of the

State would be every bit as unreasonable as the original
imposition of the statutory damage limitation.
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The petition

for rehearing should be denied.
DATED this o2#£_ day of June, 1989.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

BV^>7 /A^y^^L,

A^

M. David Eckersley^--^^
Attorneys for Plaint-Tf f s-Appellants
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